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RACIAL PROFILING REDUX 
DAVID A. HARRIS* 
In March of 2002, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch ran an article at the top of its 
op-ed page entitled Wake Up: Arabs Should Be Profiled.1  The piece, written 
by the African-American cultural critic and MacArthur Foundation “genius 
grant” recipient Stanley Crouch, employed blunt language to make the case 
that the government must target people on the basis of their ethnic appearance.  
Crouch, in the past a foe of racial profiling of American blacks on the nation’s 
highways, called unapologetically for treating all Arabs as suspects.  “[I]f 
pressure has to be kept on innocent Arabs until those Arabs who are intent on 
committing mass murder are flushed out,” Crouch wrote, “that is the 
unfortunate cost they must pay to reside in this nation.”2  Crouch has hardly 
been alone among either pundits3 or the people who run the nation’s security 
apparatus.  Even as U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta says, 
repeatedly and publicly, that there will be no racial or ethnic profiling in 
airport security,4 those who run security operations have other ideas.  Bruce 
Baumgartner, manager of aviation at Denver International Airport, told Time 
that what American airports need is more profiling, not less.5  A security 
screener at Denver told the magazine that “[f]or me, profiling is the only way 
to be conscientious in doing the job.  I make decisions based on who I 
 
* David A. Harris is the author of PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT 
WORK (2002).  He is the Balk Professor of Law and Values at the University of Toledo College 
of Law. 
 1. Stanley Crouch, Wake Up: Arabs Should Be Profiled, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 
19, 2002, at B7. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Kathleen Parker, All’s Fair In This War Except Insensitivity, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2002, 
at 19; Charles Krauthammer, The Case for Profiling: Why Random Searches of Airline Travelers 
Are a Useless Charade, TIME, Mar. 18, 2002, at 104; Jonah Goldberg, Profiles In Profiling, 
NAT’L REV., Nov. 14, 2001. 
 4. Norman Y. Mineta, U.S. Secretary of Transportation, Remarks at the Arab Community 
Center for Economic and Social Services Gala Dinner (Apr. 20, 2002) (transcript available at 
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/042002sp.htm) (“It is very tempting to take false comfort in the belief 
that we can spot the bad guy based on appearance alone.  Some are yielding to that temptation in 
their arguments for racial profiling, but false comfort is a luxury we cannot afford.”). 
 5. Richard Zoglin & Sally B. Donnelly, Welcome to America’s Best Run Airport, And Why 
It’s Still Not Good Enough, TIME, July 15, 2002, at 23. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
74 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:73 
 
wouldn’t like to be seated next to on an airplane.”  He went on to say that he 
would, “without question,” investigate anyone “of Middle Eastern descent.”6 
None of this is terribly difficult to understand.  After all, every one of the 
suicide hijackers of September 11, 2001, were young Arab Muslims from the 
Middle East; Al Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible, is based in the Middle 
East and uses the Koran as justification for its unspeakable acts.  Therefore, it 
seems to many people that it “just makes sense” to focus on people from the 
Middle East—Arabs and Muslims.  It appears that the threat we face originates 
with people of that background, so why do otherwise in the pursuit of safety?  
This thinking has shown itself quite clearly in the change in polling results on 
the issue of racial profiling.  Before September 11, 2001, a surprising 
consensus had emerged in our country concerning profiling.  At that time, 
almost sixty percent of the American public—not just African-Americans and 
Latinos, but all citizens—knew what racial profiling was, and emphatically 
wanted it stopped.7  But after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon over fifty percent of Americans, including members of minority 
groups who had been most widely victimized by profiling in the past, said they 
supported the use of profiling, as long as it was targeted at Middle Easterners 
and Muslims in airports.8 
Profiling may seem to be the obvious answer, but we have been down this 
path before, with disastrous results.  In the 1980s, it was the War on Drugs—a 
metaphorical war, to be sure, not like the war against Al Qaeda—that led to 
profiling.9  Unfortunately, instead of making us safer, using racial and ethnic 
profiling will actually damage our antiterrorism efforts.  What we should do 
now is not plunge back into racial profiling, but instead think coolly and 
clearly about what we learned about racial and ethnic profiling before 
September 11.  This will be a more difficult task than it sounds given the 
climate of fear we now live in and with the Attorney General of the United 
States declaring that those who raise questions about civil liberties at this 
juncture do no less than aid the terrorists who want to kill us.10  Nevertheless, 
 
 6. Id. at 28. 
 7. Racial Profiling Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among Young Black Men, Gallup Poll 
Organization, Dec. 9, 1999, reprinted in GEORGE GALLUP JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC 
OPINION 1999, at 238 (1999). 
 8. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Felt Uneasy toward Arabs Even Before September 11, THE 
GALLOP POLL MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at 52; Jason L. Riley, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2001, at A22. 
 9. DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 
21-23, 48-52 (2002) [hereinafter PROFILES IN INJUSTICE]. 
 10. Neil A. Lewis, Ashcroft Defends Antiterror Plan; Says Criticism May Aid U.S. Foes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at A1 (quoting the Attorney General’s testimony before Congress, in 
which he said that those who challenge the government’s policies “with phantoms of lost 
liberty. . .only aid terrorists.”). 
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we must take an unblinking look at the realities we now face.  When we do, we 
will see that there are genuine reasons to avoid using racial profiling now, lest 
we actually make it easier for our enemies to strike us. 
I.  THE COURTS AND THE LAW: ENABLERS OF RACIAL PROFILING, AND 
INEFFECTIVE TOOLS AGAINST IT 
Most lawyers probably consider racial profiling one of those abhorrent 
creatures that the law prohibits, like racial discrimination in employment or 
housing, a practice that, if proven, will bring the legal equivalent of lightning 
bolts hurled by Zeus down on the perpetrators.  The real picture has always 
been a good deal more complex, and remains so even in 2002, a full five years 
since the first legal cases and major media stories about racial profiling began 
to surface.11  It is no exaggeration to say that the courts have been largely 
ineffective in the battle against profiling.  In fact, the Supreme Court of the 
United States must actually shoulder much of the blame for racial profiling. 
Many members of the public still believe the United States Supreme Court 
is a bastion of left-leaning liberalism, especially when it comes to the rights of 
criminal defendants.  This is obviously untrue now; and it has been untrue for 
almost thirty years.  In the early 1970s, with its membership clearly shifted 
toward conservative majorities, the Supreme Court began limiting the rights of 
criminal defendants, and, more importantly, increasing the discretion of police 
officers to do searches and seizures in garden-variety street crime cases.  For 
example, in United States v. Robinson the Court increased the power of 
officers making an arrest to do a full search of anyone arrested, regardless of 
whether the arrestee presented any kind of a safety threat or could have hidden 
or destroyed evidence.12  In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte the Court affirmed the 
power of police officers to search anyone—whether the police had probable 
cause, reasonable suspicion, or any evidence at all of criminal involvement—
as long as officers obtained “voluntary” consent.13  The citizen need not give a 
Miranda-type waiver, the Court said; and the police need not tell him he has an 
absolute and unqualified right to refuse.14  As long as police did not coerce the 
citizen into agreeing to the request, the suspect’s ignorance of his rights was 
law enforcement’s bliss.  After all, the Court said, it was important that police 
be able to do warrantless searches without probable cause or any evidence at 
all.15  This statement still seems remarkable today, given that anyone with even 
the most rudimentary knowledge of Fourth Amendment requirements would 
 
 11. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
 12. 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 13. 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). 
 14. Id. at 247. 
 15. Id. at 243. 
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surely consider fact-based suspicion of criminal wrongdoing the very heart of 
constitutional protection against law enforcement intrusion, a sentiment dating 
all the way back to the revolutionary era.16 
Nowhere was this increase in police discretion with regard to searches and 
seizures more noticeable than in the area of law enforcement power over 
drivers and vehicles.  In New York v. Belton, the Justices ruled that any time 
anyone who has been riding in a vehicle was arrested—not just the driver or 
owner, but any occupant—the entire interior of the vehicle could be searched, 
including any closed compartments and containers, even if no one who had 
been in the vehicle could reach any of these areas any longer.17  And in 
California v. Acevedo, the Court solidified the power of officers to open closed 
containers without a warrant even when no arrest took place.18 
The Justices took on the use of criminal profiles (not racial profiles) in 
United States v. Sokolow.19  In Sokolow, the defendants challenged the use of 
the so-called “drug courier profile” utilized by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) to spot possible drug couriers in airports.  According to 
the DEA, the profile was a group of otherwise innocent behavioral 
characteristics—how a ticket was purchased, whether identification 
information submitted matched up with other available information about the 
traveler, and the like—that, exhibited together, predicted a greater chance that 
the person under observation was a drug courier.20  The Supreme Court was 
unimpressed with the defendants’ argument that probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion could not be generated from a constellation of otherwise innocent 
facts.  On the contrary, the Court said, if the concurrent exhibition of certain 
characteristics or behaviors was positively correlated with criminal behavior, 
there is no reason that these behaviors should not be considered a legitimate 
source for police suspicion of wrongdoing.  The fact that the factors that made 
up the profile were innocent in and of themselves made no difference at all.21 
The Supreme Court’s efforts to grant police greater discretion over stops 
and searches involving automobiles reached its high water mark in Whren v. 
United States.22  Whren was a direct challenge to this accretion of police 
 
 16. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 197, 223 (1993) (arguing that some specific basis for suspicion must exist because 
“historical evidence” suggests that the “broad principle embodied in the Reasonableness Clause is 
that discretionary police power implicating Fourth Amendment interests cannot be trusted”). 
 17. 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981). 
 18. 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). 
 19. 490 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1989). 
 20. Id. at 4. 
 21. Id. at 9.  The Court reaffirmed this reasoning this past year in United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266 (2002). 
 22. 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996). 
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powers; the defendants argued that the Justices should break with the eight 
United States Courts of Appeals that had ruled that police could use 
enforcement of traffic codes as a pretext, an excuse, to stop vehicles and 
drivers for investigation of other offenses (chiefly, the possible presence of 
drugs) for which there was absolutely no evidence.23  The Court ruled that 
using traffic code enforcement as a pretext was acceptable, as long as some 
traffic violation had actually occurred.24  The fact that the officer had no 
interest at all in traffic enforcement, but instead was using it to make an end-
run around the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that probable cause, or at 
least reasonable suspicion, of criminal behavior exist in order to make a 
forcible stop, did not trouble the Court in the least.  The Fourth Amendment, 
Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court, could no longer come into play to 
challenge pretext stops; the Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures was not offended, and could not be invoked, by those 
claiming that police had stopped them for criminal violations without any 
evidence except for traffic violations.25 
It is noteworthy that the defendants in Whren argued to the Court that the 
use of pretext stops would have a racially discriminatory impact.  Citing then-
new evidence of racial profiling from around the nation, the defendants argued 
that statistics showed that allowing police broad discretion to use traffic stops 
as an excuse to “fish” for other evidence might lead to racial profiling.26  The 
Court brushed these concerns aside in a few terse sentences.  If these pretext 
stops were being used in racially discriminatory patterns, Justice Scalia said, 
this had nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment; rather, it could only be 
addressed in lawsuits for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.27 
With these Supreme Court decisions as background, it is hardly surprising 
that the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began a sustained effort in 
the 1980s and 1990s to train state and local police in the techniques of drug 
courier profiling for use on the highway.  This program, called Operation 
Pipeline, was backed with millions of federal dollars.28  Taking full advantage 
of the expanded discretion allowed to the police by the Court’s decisions, the 
DEA trained literally tens of thousands of police officers from all over the 
country, who then trained others in their own and other departments, and set up 
state and local highway drug interdiction units.29  Combined with federal 
government intelligence that was sent to local agencies that emphasized the 
 
 23. Id. at 810. 
 24. Id. at 811-13, 819. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 810. 
 27. Id. at 813. 
 28. PROFILES IN INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 48-52. 
 29. Id. 
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race of drug traffickers in very general terms—“marijuana trafficking in New 
Jersey is controlled by blacks,” for example—Operation Pipeline makes the 
emergence of racial profiling entirely predictable. 
Especially after Whren, the lack of litigation success in suits against racial 
profiling does not seem surprising.  Indeed, the only thing that seems 
noteworthy is that so many lawyers and members of the public still believe that 
these lawsuits have, in fact, had a major role in addressing and taming racial 
profiling.  To be sure, two of the first and most important cases of racial 
profiling, occurring in Maryland and New Jersey, garnered attention through 
successful litigation.  The success and notoriety of these cases, however, is due 
at least in part to their unusual circumstances.  In Maryland, the case styled 
Wilkins v. Maryland State Police,30 featured plaintiff Robert Wilkins, a soft-
spoken, African-American, criminal defense attorney and Harvard Law School 
graduate who repeatedly objected to his treatment by the State Police, even 
citing cases to them.  When litigation began, attorneys discovered a “smoking 
gun” in State Police files, a written memorandum that clearly set out a racial 
profile.31  The result in this case was a quick settlement in which the State 
Police agreed to submit statistics on their stop and search practices to the 
federal court for a period of several years, and to modify their policies and 
practices.32  The case in New Jersey, styled State v. Pedro Soto,33 was based 
not only on federal law but also on New Jersey’s Constitution and case law, 
which provide citizens of that state with more protection against racial 
discrimination than they have under federal law.34  Far more common are cases 
in which courts slam the door on plaintiffs seeking to use the Equal Protection 
Clause (as suggested by Justice Scalia in Whren) or anti-discrimination 
statutes, usually by requiring that plaintiffs meet impossibly high standards to 
prove these claims.35 
In fact, only one type of litigation against profiling had consistent success 
in the 1990s: so-called “pattern-and-practice” suits brought by the U.S. 
Department of Justice under a specific federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 14141.36  
 
 30. See Settlement Agreement, Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. 93-468 (D. Md. 
approved Jan. 1, 1995). 
 31. Armed Drug Traffickers in Allegany County, Maryland: Police Officer Safety, CRIMINAL 
INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Maryland State Police), Apr. 27, 1992 (on file with author). 
 32. Settlement Agrement, supra note 30, at 4-5. 
 33. 734 A.2d 350, 359-60 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). 
 34. Id. at 360. 
 35. E.g., Washington v. Vogel, 106 F.3d 415 (11th Cir. 1997) (unpublished decision 
affirming Washington v. Vogel, 880 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D.Fla. 1995)); Chavez v. Illinois State 
Police, 251 F.3d 612, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2001); Daryl Kelly, Federal Racial Profiling Suit is 
Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, at B1. 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000). 
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This statute allows the federal government to bring an action in federal court 
when the facts show not just a single or even a few violations of law, but a 
demonstrable pattern of civil rights deprivations by police over a sustained 
period.  A handful of such cases, in Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, Steubenville, 
Ohio, and New Jersey, have resulted in consent decrees in which the police 
departments have agreed to make changes in their policies, procedures, 
training, internal structures, and administration.37  In several other cases, 
including those in Washington, D.C. and Montgomery County, Maryland, 
local governments have invited federal pattern and practice investigations and 
agreed to be bound by federal recommendations.38  While these suits and 
investigations unquestionably have made for better policing in the cities 
affected, there have been relatively few of these cases since the statute’s 
enactment in 1994.39  Perhaps more importantly, only the federal government 
can bring these cases; the law makes no provision for any private right of 
action.40 
Thus, it has been institutions and methods other than courts and 
litigation—legislatures, public discussion and debate, and interaction with 
police departments themselves—that have become the major locus of activity 
on the issue of racial profiling.  Courts have not only provided little relief; they 
have encouraged the activity and even enabled it to continue unaddressed. 
II.  WHAT WE KNEW ABOUT RACIAL PROFILING BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11 
When public discussion of profiling first began in the middle 1990s, police 
and public officials reacted uniformly; they denied that any such practice 
existed, and said that any stories from people of color concerning the repeated 
stops they experienced at the hands of the police were not evidence of any 
 
 37. Consent Decree, United States v. Pittsburgh (W.D. Penn. approved Apr. 16, 1997), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htm; Consent Decree, United States 
v. Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 (C.D. Cal. approved June 15, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm; Consent Decree, United States v. 
Steubenville Police Dept. (S.D. Ohio approved Sept. 3, 1997), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/steubensa.htm; Joint Application for Entry of Consent 
Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (D. N.J. approved Dec. 30, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm. 
 38. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THTE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN 
POLICE DEPARTMENT (June 13, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/ 
dcmoa.htm; MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND, THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 
POLICE AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY LODGE 35, INC. (Jan. 
14, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/Pubs/mcagrmt.htm. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) (2000). 
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problem.  Rather, these stories were simply the excuses of those caught 
breaking the law.  (Never mind the fact that the stories came largely from law-
abiding, tax-paying citizens who had never been charged with any crime.)  But 
with the release of data from Maryland, New Jersey, and other jurisdictions in 
the mid to late 1990s, the denial argument became untenable.  All of these 
data, from different places in the country and from different law enforcement 
agencies with different missions, pointed in the same direction: police officers 
in these departments were definitely using race and ethnic appearance to target 
minorities for searches and seizures at levels widely disproportionate to the 
presence of these same people among the driving population.41  These 
disparities were so statistically striking that the leading expert in the field, Dr. 
John Lamberth of Temple University, described them this way: “While no one 
can know the motivation of each individual trooper in conducting a traffic stop, 
the statistics . . ., representing a broad and detailed sample of highly 
appropriate data, show without question a racially discriminatory impact on 
blacks. . . .  The disparities are sufficiently great that, taken as a whole, they 
are consistent and strongly support the assertion that [police] targeted the 
community of black motorists for stop, detention, and investigation. . . .”42  
Thus, it began to become obvious to most observers that the countless stories 
of African-Americans and Latinos were not just stories, but rather illustrations 
of a real, measurable phenomenon. 
This new information caused a shift in the public debate.  To be sure, some 
still contend that there is no such thing as racial profiling.43  But, by and large, 
the discussion has changed.  Defenders of profiling now contend that the 
practice is simply a common sense, rational response to high levels of 
criminality among minorities.  Look at arrest rates and imprisonment rates, 
they say; minorities are vastly over-represented in relation to their presence in 
the population.  Therefore, the argument goes, it just makes sense to target 
 
 41. For a review of racial profiling data, the circumstances of the cases surrounding their 
release, and the stories of individuals subjected to race-based traffic stops, see PROFILES IN 
INJUSTICE, supra note 9; David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving 
While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999); DAVID A. HARRIS, ACLU, DRIVING WHILE 
BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS (June 1999), 
http://archive.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html. 
 42. John Lamberth, Report of John Lamberth, Ph.D. (Nov. 8, 1996) (an expert report 
prepared in connection to Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. 93-483 (D. Md. 1993)), available 
at http://archive.aclu.org/court/lamberth.html. 
 43. Most vocal among these critics is Heather Mac Donald of the Manhattan Institute of 
New York.  See Heather Mac Donald, The Myth of Racial Profiling, CITY JOURNAL, Spring 2001, 
available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/11_2_the_myth.html; Heather Mac Donald, The 
Myth of Racial Profiling Debunked, CITY JOURNAL, Spring 2002, available at http://www.city-
journal.org/html/ eon_3_27_02hm.html. 
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these populations with our law enforcement resources.44  By encouraging 
police to pull over, stop, frisk, and search more people of color, racial profiling 
gives police a leg up in the fight against crime and drugs.  By focusing on 
blacks and Latinos, police increase the odds that those they stop and search 
will be criminals.  It is simple, and will help officers catch more bad guys, find 
more drugs, and confiscate more guns than would otherwise be the case.  In 
other words, racial profiling is just smart crime fighting.  As one police 
spokesman explained, the fact that racial profiling results in larger numbers of 
arrests of blacks and Latinos is just an unfortunate by-product of sound 
policing.45 
There are at least two problems with this thinking. First, when proponents 
of profiling point to disproportionate incarceration and arrest levels among 
minority populations, they are not wrong about those facts.  Blacks, Latinos, 
and others are, in fact, disproportionately arrested and incarcerated.46  Those 
may be difficult facts for some to admit, but that does not make them less true.  
The real question is what those facts actually mean. 
Supporters of racial profiling use these numbers as a kind of substitute 
crime rate, arguing that the elevated arrest and incarceration rates are 
indicative of a higher rate of criminal perpetration among blacks and other 
minorities, and that is where they err.  Arrest rates are not, as many seem to 
believe, measurements of crime.  Arrest rates are measurements of a particular 
type of law enforcement behavior—arresting.  The same goes for statistics on 
incarceration.  These numbers do not measure crime; rather, they measure what 
one might call incarceration behavior by relevant actors: judges who 
pronounce sentences, legislators who pass laws governing sentences, members 
of sentencing commissions, and the like.  Arrest rates and imprisonment rates 
may have some relationship to actual rates of offending, but how close a 
relationship, whether it varies by type of crime, and how great a variation we 
might see, are all questions that, at best, remain unanswered by simply citing 
arrest and imprisonment statistics.  This very point was made four decades ago 
by two social scientists, John Kitsuse and Aaron Cicourel.47  Kitsuse and 
Cicourel showed that while records of arrest and court activity give us useful 
information regarding the activity of institutions like police departments and 
courts, they present real problems when used to depict patterns of criminal 
 
 44. See, e.g., Marshall Frank, Racial Profiling: Better Safe Than Sorry, MIAMI HERALD, 
Oct. 19, 1999, at B7 (arguing that disproportionately high rates of imprisonment among blacks 
justify more intense scrutiny of blacks by law enforcement). 
 45. Michael Fletcher, Driven to Extremes; Black Men Take Steps to Avoid Police Stops, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at A1. 
 46. PROFILES IN INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 75-76. 
 47. John Kitsuse & Aaron Cicourel, A Note on the Use of Official Statistics, 11 SOCIAL 
PROBLEMS 131 (1963). 
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behavior or characteristics of offenders.48  In his 1995 Southerland Prize 
lecture to the American Society of Criminology, the esteemed criminologist 
Delbert Elliot of the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence at the 
University of Colorado asserted that we had failed to heed Kitsuse and 
Cicourel, and “had fallen into bad habits” by continuing to use arrest data to 
support conclusions about the characteristic behaviors of offenders.  Using 
statistics this way, Elliot said, will “lead to incorrect conclusions, ineffective 
policies and practices, and ultimately undermine our efforts to understand, 
prevent, and control criminal behavior.”49  There is nothing wrong with using 
arrest and imprisonment numbers, but they can only help us if we understand 
them for what they are. 
The second problem with the racial-profiling-is-common-sense-crime-
fighting idea—stop and search more minorities and you will catch more 
criminals—is that it is an assumption.  It is a strongly held, confidently 
expressed assumption to be sure, but an assumption nonetheless, and it has 
never been tested until recently.  But now, new data about police stops and 
searches, available in just the last couple of years, enables us to test this central 
assumption.  These new data, gathered from different enforcement agencies in 
various parts of the country, allow us to make direct comparisons between the 
success rates of stops and searches when police use racial profiling on 
minorities, to their success rates when they use nonracial policing techniques 
on whites.  In other words, these new data allow us to compare the rate at 
which officers “hit”—find drugs, guns, or other contraband—using 
nonracialized policing based on observation of suspicious behavior (i.e., the 
stops and searches of whites) with the hit rate for racially targeted policing (the 
highly disproportionate stops and searches of blacks and Latinos).  These hit 
rates can help us answer the question that has previously gone unasked: does 
profiling using race and ethnic appearance, in fact, help catch more bad guys? 
The hit rate data come from at least half a dozen studies.50  They cover a 
range of geographic areas, law enforcement missions, and agency sizes.  All 
data were collected by the law enforcement agencies themselves.  It is surely 
fair to say that the result in all of these studies would come as something of a 
surprise to supporters of racial profiling as a common-sense tool in crime 
fighting.  All the data showed that concentrating on minorities did not, in fact, 
yield more arrests than using traditional tactics of behavioral observation 
against whites.  Race-based stops and searches of minorities actually yielded 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Delbert Elliot, Lies, Damn Lies, and Arrest Statistics, address at the Southerland Award 
Presentation to the American Society of Criminology (Nov.1995). 
 50. The details of hit rate studies quoted here appear in more detail in PROFILES IN 
INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 79-81. 
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fewer hits on a percentage basis in all of these studies than traditional, 
behavior-based stops of whites did.  The upshot of this remarkable consistency 
across a number of different studies is hard to miss: law enforcement using 
racial and ethnic profiles is not, in fact, a sensible crime fighting tool.  It 
actually works less well than traditional policing, which relies on observation 
of behavior.  Racial and ethnic profiling do not increase law enforcement’s 
efficiency or its yield; in fact, using this tactic drags policing down—the 
equivalent of having police officers chase crooks with lead weights around 
their ankles. 
Though these results, solid as they are, seem counterintuitive, they are not 
difficult to understand on reflection.  Using race or ethnic appearance to decide 
who is suspicious turns officers away from what we might call the first 
principle of good policing: the observation of suspicious behavior.  Using 
racial profiling, officers pay attention instead to racial or ethnic appearance—a 
characteristic that may describe someone well, but that has little power to 
predict criminal behavior in any sizeable population.  By contrast, proactive 
police work is all about looking at what people do.  Behavior is the best clue an 
officer can have about what someone is up to and what the person may do 
next. 
All of this discussion about the effectiveness of racial profiling, of course, 
simply adds to the very real and important moral and social concern the issue 
generates.  Americans have long recognized the moral bankruptcy of the idea 
of group guilt.  Just because someone belongs to a group that has some small 
number of members who may do harm, we cannot treat all members of that 
group as presumptively guilty of the offense.  When we have deviated from 
that principle—the internment of the Japanese during World War II springs 
readily to mind51—we have, at least belatedly, acknowledged these actions as 
terrible mistakes.52  Group guilt, or, perhaps better said, group suspicion, is 
exactly what racial and ethnic profiling is.  As far as social costs, we have long 
since passed the point at which the damage done by racial and ethnic 
profiling—the anger, distrust and cynicism that it causes—could be said to 
damage only individual citizens, or even just particular ethnic or racial groups.  
These costs have leached out of the targeted groups and into society as a 
whole, causing widespread suspicion, not just of policing; but also of courts, 
 
 51. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (refusing to strike down 
internment orders). 
 52. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating 
convictions because government information supporting internment-related orders was false); 
Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts, 50 U.S.C. § 1989 
(1988); see generally Frank Wu, Profiling In the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of 
Japanese Internment, 17 CRIM. JUSTICE 52, 56 (Summer 2002). 
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the entire legal system, and even the rule of law itself.53  When one segment of 
society is seen as unfairly targeted or persecuted by the system, the system 
itself loses legitimacy—not just in the eyes of those on the receiving end of the 
abusive treatment, but also in the eyes of all citizens.  And that is a cost to all 
of society. 
For these and other reasons, most importantly the existence of broad public 
support and political pressure for action, states and cities around the country 
have begun to take the first steps to address profiling.  This movement (if that 
is not too bold a word) began with the 105th Congress, when Representative 
John Conyers, Jr. of Michigan seized on a proposal made in a law review 
article: police should collect basic data on each and every police stop.54  
Conyers introduced a piece of legislation embodying all of the proposal’s 
central elements: data would be collected on each traffic stop, including the 
reason for the stop, the race of the driver, whether a search was conducted and 
on what basis, and whether the search uncovered any contraband.  The 
proposed legislation, called the Traffic Stops Statistics Act,55 attracted virtually 
no notice at first, and, therefore, no opposition.  But, when an amended version 
of the bill emerged with a unanimous recommendation from the Republican-
controlled U.S. House Judiciary Committee and then passed the House of 
Representatives without any opposition in March of 1998,56 the public 
suddenly became aware of it.  The passage of the bill was widely reported in 
the press, and police groups quickly mobilized in opposition to it.  A fairly 
typical reaction came from the National Association of Police Organizations 
(NAPO), an umbrella group that represents approximately four thousand police 
interest groups.  There was “no pressing need or justification” for any action 
on the problem, a NAPO spokesman said, since there was no real problem.57  
Furthermore, officers would “resent” having to take any steps to address this 
nonexistent problem, even just the step of collecting data.58  This opposition, 
combined with the presidential impeachment proceedings that seized the 
attention of Congress and the nation in the fall of 1998, was enough to kill the 
bill’s chances of passage by the Senate during what remained of the 105th 
Congress.  A new version of the bill was introduced unsuccessfully in the 106th 
 
 53. PROFILES IN INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 117-21. 
 54. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme 
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 579-80 (1997). 
 55. Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997, H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 56. 144 CONG. REC. H1387 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1998), available at 1998 WL 129711. 
 57. Robert L. Jackson, Fight Against Discriminatory Traffic Stops Appears to Have Hit a 
Police Roadblock, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1998, at A5. 
 58. Id. 
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Congress;59 and a much more comprehensive piece of legislation—The End 
Racial Profiling Act of 200160—was still pending at the end of 2002. 
Even if the federal legislation never passes, however, there is now real 
government action in many places that is designed to address the issue in some 
basic ways.  More than fifteen states have passed legislation mandating some 
kind of data collection on traffic stops, as well as requiring other actions and 
changes including written policies against profiling and new training 
programs.61  Missouri’s legislation62 represents the best of these efforts.  It 
 
 59. Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 60. S. 989, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 61. E.g., COLORADO (COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-309 (2001) (defines “profiling” and bans 
peace officers from doing it); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-115 (2001) (data collection on traffic 
stops to include race among other characteristics); CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-11 
(2001) (prohibition against racial profiling by police departments; data collection required); 
KANSAS (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4604 (2002)); MARYLAND (MD. CODE. ANN., TRANSP. § 
25-113 (2001) (race data must be collected by officers at traffic stops, but profiling shall not be 
used by officers making traffic stops); MISSOURI (MO. REV. STAT. § 590.050 (2001) (annual 
education for police officers opposing use of racial profiling and encouraging respect for all 
races); MO. REV. STAT. § 590.650 (2001) (prohibits the practice of routinely stopping members 
of minority groups for violations of vehicle laws as a pretext for investigating other violations of 
criminal law); NEBRASKA (NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-501 (2002) (defines “racial profiling” and 
refers to motorists being stopped based solely upon their race as a discriminatory practice); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 20-502 (2002) (prohibits the use of racial profiling by all police officers in the 
state); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-503 (2002) (racial profiling defined as “detaining an individual or 
conducting a motor vehicle stop based upon disparate treatment of an individual); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 20-504 (2002) (police must collect data on race from their traffic stops); NORTH 
CAROLINA (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-10 (2002) (data collection on race by police officers 
making stop); RHODE ISLAND (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.1-2 (2001) (prohibits use of racial 
profiling in traffic stops); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.1-4 (2001) (traffic stop studies to be conducted 
by R.I. Att’y Gen.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.1-5 (2001) (prohibits the use of racial profiling as 
the sole reason for stopping or searching motorists for routine traffic stops); TENNESSEE 
(TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-402 (2001) (police must record info on traffic stops including race); 
TEXAS (TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 96.641 (Vernon 2002) (chiefs of police are to have initial and 
continuing training on racial profiling); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.253 (Vernon 2002) (as part 
of the minimum curriculum requirements, the commission shall establish a statewide 
comprehensive education and training program on racial profiling for officers licensed under this 
chapter); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.402 (Vernon 2002) (racial profiling certificates for law 
enforcement officers that participate in the program); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.131 
(Vernon 2002) (a peace officer may not engage in racial profiling); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 2.135 (Vernon 2002); (Certain law enforcement agencies shall retain the video and 
audio documentation of each traffic and pedestrian stop for at least 90 days after the date of the 
stop.  If a complaint is filed with the law enforcement agency alleging that a peace officer 
employed by the agency has engaged in racial profiling with respect to a traffic or pedestrian stop, 
the agency shall retain the video and audio record of the stop until final disposition of the 
complaint); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132 (Vernon 2002) (prohibits use of racial 
profiling and requires data collection from traffic stops including race); UTAH (UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 53-1-106 (2002) (public safety code department administration must maintain a database 
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mandates an end to racial profiling, the collection of data on all traffic stops by 
every law enforcement agency in the state, new written policies against racial 
profiling, and anti-profiling training for officers.63  For departments that do not 
comply with these requirements, the law empowers the state’s attorney general 
to recommend to the governor that these departments lose their state funding.64  
Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon, whose office has supervised 
implementation of the new law, says the statute represents a comprehensive 
and strong effort to deal with the problem.65 
Perhaps more significant than these legislative efforts, hundreds of police 
agencies around the country that are not under any legislative obligation to do 
 
of information including the race of the person stopped and checked and the race of the law 
enforcement officer who made the stop); see also Components of Racial Profiling Legislation, 
Memorandum from the Institute on Race & Poverty, to Senators Linda Berglin, Jane Ranum, and 
Representative Greg Gray (March 5, 2001), http://www.instituteonraceandpoverty.org/ 
publications/racialprofiling.html. 
  There are additional states that have passed legislation, the provisions of which do not 
require data collection. These laws usually just prohibit racial profiling but carry no 
consequences: e.g., CALIFORNIA (CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.4 (Dearing 2002) (Police officers 
are to be trained not to use racial profiling as a tool.  Data collection regarding race is voluntary.); 
KENTUCKY (KY. REV. STATE. ANN. § 15A.195 (Michie 2001)); LOUISIANA (LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 32:398.10 (West 2002) (officers must view learning video about racial profiling, 
inapplicable to any law enforcement agency or department that has adopted a written policy 
against racial profiling); MINNESOTA (MINN. STAT. § 626.8471 (2001) (racial profiling defined 
and officers trained); MINN. STAT. § 626.951 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 626.9513 (2001) (study to 
be carried out by the state commissioner of safety and those law enforcement agencies whom 
volunteer to be part of the study); MINN. STAT. § 626.9514 (2001) (Att’y Gen. must have a toll 
free phone number for complaints about incidents of racial profiling); MINN. STAT. § 626.9517 
(2001) (grants to agencies participating in racial profiling study for the purchase of video cameras 
for police vehicles); OKLAHOMA (OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 34.3 (2002) (racial profiling is 
prohibited and criminalized; racial profiling it is a misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 34.4 
(2002) (victim of racial profiling may file a complaint with the Oklahoma Human Rights 
Commission and may also file a complaint with the district attorney for the county in which the 
stop or arrest occurred); OKLA. STAT. tit 22, § 34.5 (2002)); WASHINGTON (WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 43.43.490 (West 2002) (training police officers on racial profiling); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 43.43.480(1) (West 2002) (data collection, including race, is encouraged for all traffic 
stops); WEST VIRGINIA (W. VA. CODE § 30-29-10 (2001) (racial profiling by law enforcement 
agencies is prohibited). 
 62. See MO. REV. STAT. § 590.650, et seq. (2000 & Supp. 2001). 
 63. MO. REV. STAT. § 590.650.6 (2000 & Supp. 2001). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Jeremiah W. (“Jay”) Nixon, Remarks on Racial Profiling in Missouri, 22 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 53, 53 (2003).  For a discussion of the origin of the Missouri statute see Leland 
Ware, Prohibiting Racial Profiling: The ACLU’s Orchestration of the Missouri Legislaiton, 22 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 59, 60 (2003). 
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so have taken similar action on their own.66  In fact, this has become common 
enough that an announcement that a city will begin collecting data no longer 
makes national headlines the way that it did just a short time ago.  It is easy to 
forget that the first sizeable agencies to begin collecting data on their own – 
San Diego and San Jose, California – began their efforts only in 1999.67  While 
data collection is hardly the norm everywhere, it no longer stands out as 
something that all police agencies resist. 
III.  PROFILING IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 
In the aftermath of the catastrophic terrorist attacks on September 11, we 
learned that all of those who had hijacked the planes that day were Arabs and 
Muslims from Middle Eastern countries.68  Our enemy was Al Qaeda, an 
 
 66. E.g., in CALIFORNIA: San Diego (Jean Allience Colston, Ignorance Will Not Bring 
Equality, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUTE, April 28, 2002, at G3), San Jose (Lisa O’Neill Hill, 
Delving Into Disparities: Issue Under Study, Scrutiny Locally and Nationwide, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE, February 24, 2002, at A1), Los Angeles (Solomon Moore, The State Rights Groups 
Sue Davis Over Racial Profiling Data, LOS ANGELES TIMES, November 2, 2001, at B8); in 
FLORIDA: Jacksonville and Florida Highway Patrol (Manoucheka Celeste, Profiling No Longer 
Practiced, Police Say Officials Support Law Banning Racial Stops, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, June 
22, 2001, at B1); in MICHIGAN: Grand Rapids (Mike Connell, Search After Traffic Stop Raises 
Question of Equal Treatment, TIMES HERALD (Port Huron, Mich.) May 19, 2002, at 7B), 
Highway Patrol (Survey Doesn’t Reveal Profiling, CHICAGO TRIB., January 25, 2001, at 3); in 
OHIO: Cincinnati (Derrick DePledge, Promise to End Racial Profiling on Back Burner After 
Sept. 11, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, April 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 5257537), Ohio State 
Highway Patrol (Jennine Zeleznik, State Sen. Roberts’ Bill Would Require Demographic Data 
From Traffic Stops; Legislation Would Show if Agencies Using Racial Profiling, DAYTON DAILY 
NEWS, April 18, 2002, at 3B), Cleveland (T.C. Brown, O’Connor Says Racial Profiling Not A 
Problem, PLAIN DEALER, December 8, 2000 at 8B); in OREGON: Highway Patrol and Portland 
Police (Maxine Bernstein, State Police Post Findings On Stops By Driver’s Race, OREGONIAN, 
May 9, 2002, at A1); in PENNSYLVANIA: Highway Patrol (Keith Herbert, Forms Arrive Late 
for Penn State Study of Racial Patterns in Police Traffic Stops; State Troopers Will Take 
Information to Look for Evidence of Profiling, MORNING CALL (Allentown), April 2, 2002, at 
B4), Pittsburgh and Philadelphia Police (John M.R. Bull, State Panel Hears Testimony on Racial 
Profiling by Police, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, October 23, 2001 at pg B7); in SOUTH 
CAROLINA: State Highway Patrol (Greg Rickabaugh, Study Hints Police Ticket More Blacks; 
Survey Suggests South Carolina Troopers are Pulling Over, Citing High Percentage of 
Minorities, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, July 1, 2001, at C1); in WISCONSIN: Madison (Pat 
Schneider, Latinos Tell of Fear in Sauk; Want Traffic Cops to Keep Racial Data, Stop 
Harassment, CAPITAL TIMES, July 11, 2002, at 1B). 
 67. See Paul Van Slambrouck, Two cities tackle racial profiling, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Mar. 29, 1999, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/03/29/fp2s1-
csm.shtml. 
 68. Dan Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, U.S. Seeks Thousands of Fugitive Deportees; 
Middle Eastern Men are Focus of Search, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 
WL 2519501. 
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organization based on a radical (some even say perverted) interpretation of the 
Islamic faith.69  In a heartbeat, everything we had learned about racial 
profiling—its costs and the illusory nature of its crime-fighting benefits—
disappeared.  Since the perpetrators were all young Muslim men from the 
Middle East, the solution seemed obvious: we needed to use a profile at 
airports that would focus law enforcement attention on young Middle Eastern 
men.  An ethnic profile targeting them was not discrimination; it was a sensible 
anti-terrorist measure.  Syndicated columnist Kathleen Parker gave voice to 
this feeling when she called racial profiling of Middle Eastern men “a 
temporary necessity that no patriotic American should protest.”70 
A. Is It Happening? 
The first question that should be asked is whether or not ethnic profiling of 
Arabs and Muslims is in fact happening.  There seems to be a widespread 
belief that the government is bending over backwards to avoid ethnic profiling.  
While certain segments of the government may in fact be doing so, it is also 
obvious that ethnic targeting is definitely in use.  For example, in an eerie echo 
of the DEA’s Operation Pipeline, the 1980s effort to spread racial profiling to 
traffic enforcement all across the nation,71 federal law enforcement officials 
now travel the nation offering anti-terrorism training to state and local police.  
The federal officials tell local officers to use traffic stops as a pretext to spot 
potential terrorists.72  “Among the items police are taught to look for besides 
phony passports and fake or stolen drivers’ licenses: prayer rugs and copies of 
the Koran, Islam’s holy book.”73 
Even more disturbing, however, are some of the actions of the U.S. 
Department of Justice.  In the fall of 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft 
decreed that the Department would conduct “voluntary” interviews with 5,000 
young men from the Middle East.74  In the spring of 2002, the Attorney 
General added another 3,000 names to the list.75  The Department has also 
detained hundreds of Middle Easterners on petty immigration violations and 
 
 69. Aaron Zitner & Richard A. Serrano, Response to Terror the Anthrax Threat Answers in 
Anthrax Probe Only Yield More, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at A5, available at 2001 WL 
28922057. 
 70. Parker, supra note 3, at 19. 
 71. PROFILES IN INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 21-23. 
 72. Kevin Johnson, In the Heartland, A Call to Mobilize, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 2002, at 1A. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Allan Lengel, Arab Men in Detroit to Be Asked to See U.S. Attorney, WASH. POST, Nov. 
27, 2001, at A5, available at 2001 WL 30328341. 
 75. Special Report with Brit Hume, Fox News television broadcast (Mar. 20, 2002), 
available at 2002 WL 5584774. 
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minor criminal violations.76  The exact number still detained as of this writing 
is not known because the Department has refused to answer any questions 
about the detainees.77  The Attorney General has also used the material witness 
statute78 to detain those he suspects of involvement, but against whom he has 
no evidence.79  All of this is racial and ethnic targeting by any other name.  
Concededly, the violators of immigration law detained by the Department of 
Justice have broken the law.  Yet, while hundreds of thousands of other people 
in this country have also broken immigration laws, the government has only 
detained members of one narrow group for these offenses, Muslims and 
Middle Easterners, who have been selected for this treatment by virtue of 
ethnicity. 
B. Will It Work? 
If officials are, in fact, using ethnic profiling now, a second question looms 
even larger: will it work?  Will ethnic profiling actually help to make the U.S. 
safe from terrorists?  Many people today seem to regard the use of ethnic 
profiles against Middle Easterners as “just common sense” in the fight against 
terrorism.  But, as in the War on Drugs, this “common sense” profiling of 
Middle Easterners has little to do with good, solid law enforcement.  And in 
the end, it will almost certainly blunt efforts to protect the country against 
terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda. 
First, consider the centerpiece of all good police work: observation of 
suspicious behavior.  It is a truism among veteran police officers that it is not 
what people look like that tells them who to regard as suspicious; it is what 
people do that matters.80  If police officers want to know what someone is up 
to, they watch the subject’s behavior; what the person has done and what the 
person is doing now are the best indicators of what that person will do in the 
future.  Using a racial or ethnic profile to decide whom to stop and search cuts 
directly against this experience-based rule.  When law enforcement uses skin 
color or ethnic appearance as a proxy for actual dangerousness, law 
enforcement agents shift their attention.  They begin to turn away from what 
counts—how people behave—and instead attend to what people look like.  
 
 76. Dan Eggen, Tough Anti-Terror Campaign Pledged; Ashcroft Tells Mayors He Will Use 
New Law to Fullest Extent, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 29164803. 
 77. Siobhan Gorman, Power to the Government, NAT’L J., Jul 27, 2002, available at 2002 
WL 7095407. 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000). 
 79. Steve Fainaru & Dan Eggen, Judge Rules U.S. Must Release Detainees’ Names, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 3, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 24825355. 
 80. Indeed, this was a sentiment expressed to the author by experienced officers so 
frequently in the course of research interviews that few ever question it.  All behavioral profiling 
depends on this assumption. 
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They pay less attention to what is important—behavior—and more to what is 
literally only skin deep.  It is crucial that those on the front line in the fight 
against Al Qaeda not miss anything that might tell them whether any particular 
person they observe is a potential terrorist; injecting race or ethnic appearance 
into the mix of characteristics that we want police to look for when they search 
for possible terrorists can only distract officers from what actually counts. 
The distraction of law enforcement agents from all-important behavioral 
clues leads directly to a second point.  Even a “good” profile, one that is based 
on rigorously analyzed statistics culled from plentiful, systematically collected 
data, will cast suspicion over more innocent people than guilty ones.  When we 
construct a profile using the wrong kind of characteristic—racial ones as 
opposed to markers of behavior—we effectively enlarge our suspect pool.  
When the police regard as suspects not just those who act like potential 
terrorists but also those who look like potential terrorists, they end up with 
many more people to investigate, the overwhelming majority of whom will 
have exhibited no behavior in which the police might be interested.  This will 
inevitably mean that law enforcement resources and efforts will be spread 
more thinly than is wise.  Even the FBI does not have unlimited manpower; 
every person who they must investigate because he “looks like a terrorist” 
takes away enforcement resources from investigations of suspects who actually 
behave suspiciously.  And that is a trade off that makes little sense. 
Third, if the keenest possible observation of behavior is one of the pillars 
of solid police work, then the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
intelligence is surely another.  Intelligence in police work is simply 
information, information that tells law enforcement about things in a 
community that are suspicious.  There is nothing new in this as far as police 
work goes.  Ask any veteran police detective what it takes to solve a major 
crime, a murder, say, or a robbery.  Since police almost never observe such 
crimes when they occur, they have to figure out who did it after the fact.  From 
watching television and movies, one might think that Sherlock Holmes-style 
deduction or high-tech forensic work in the crime lab do the trick.  While this 
is certainly true in some cases, what counts much more often is what people 
who live and work in the area will tell police.81  It is a truism among police 
officers that in most murders perpetrated by persons unknown to the police, 
 
 81. The best example of this as of this writing is the arrest and indictment of six men of 
Yemeni descent in Lackawanna, N.Y., in the fall of 2002, for various terrorism-related crimes.  
The information leading to the apprehension of the men came not from spy satellites or 
infiltrators but from members of the Yemeni community in Lackawanna.  Philip Shenon, Threats 
and Responses: Indictment; U.S. Says Suspects Awaited An Order For Terror Strike, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 15, 2002, at A1 (investigation was begun after federal law enforcement received 
“information from within the area’s Muslim community months ago [prior to indictment] that 
people loyal to Al Qaeda might be living among them”). 
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people in the neighborhood usually know who did the crime; it is only the 
police who do not.  Solving these crimes depends on getting the public to give 
that information to the police. 
We have all heard numerous times since September 11, 2001, how the 
events of that day represent a massive failure of the intelligence agencies to 
compile the necessary information due to an egregious failure to “connect the 
dots.”82  These failures, and the real possibility that we may very well have Al 
Qaeda “sleeper” cells of Middle Easterners on our soil, obviously make 
intelligence gathering more crucial than it has ever been.  Intelligence agencies 
and law enforcement simply must have open lines of free-flowing 
communication with those who might have important information on potential 
terrorists.  That information will almost certainly have to come from those 
most likely to encounter the individuals in these “sleeper” cells: members of 
Middle Eastern, Muslim, and Arab communities.  Thus, what law enforcement 
needs most right now are solid relationships with the Arab and Muslim 
communities in the U.S., relationships based on trust and mutual interest, 
fostered over time while working as partners in fighting crime.  However, 
using a profile focusing on Arab and Muslim heritage—whether by 
questioning 8,000 young male Arabs, or by detaining an unknown number of 
Middle Easterners (but no members of any other group) on petty immigration 
charges—will not foster trust; it will not help build the solid relationships 
necessary for effective communication and real partnership.  Rather, profiling 
will do quite the opposite: it will communicate to these communities that law 
enforcement regards them not as partners in terror prevention, but as potential 
terrorists—in short, as suspects.  When we take away their freedom on 
relatively trivial grounds on the chance that they might be terrorists, since we’d 
rather be safe than sorry, we sow not trust, but fear.  This fear naturally cuts off 
the possibilities for open communication, destroying our ability to gather 
crucial intelligence. 
All of this explains why many high-placed law enforcement professionals 
quickly rejected the “common sense” approach of profiling Middle Easterners.  
Attorney General Ashcroft’s “voluntary” questioning of Middle Eastern men 
met with instant skepticism in many major police departments.  Police 
command staff quickly recognized the damage that this questioning would do 
to their long-term efforts to build crime-fighting partnerships and intelligence 
links with their Middle Eastern communities.83  Eight former FBI officials, 
including former FBI and CIA chief William H. Webster, went on record in the 
 
 82. Al Kamen, Stand by Your Man, Sort of, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2001, at A29, available at 
2001 WL 28361577. 
 83. E.g., Fox Butterfield, Police Are Split On Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 2001, at A1. 
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Washington Post to voice doubts about the law enforcement value of these 
tactics.84  “It’s the Perry Mason School of Law Enforcement . . .,” according to 
Kenneth Walton, a former assistant FBI director.85  The interviews, he said, 
would likely produce nothing more valuable than “the recipe to Mom’s 
chicken soup.”86  Little wonder, then, that senior intelligence officials 
circulated a memorandum just weeks after the events of September 11 that 
warned law enforcement and intelligence agents about the dangers of racial 
and ethnic profiling.87  Profiling with racial or ethnic characteristics should be 
avoided at all costs, the intelligence professionals said, but not because it was 
politically incorrect, would generate bad publicity, or might lead to lawsuits.  
The reasons were much more straightforward: profiling with these skin-deep 
characteristics would fail.  The only way to succeed was careful observation of 
suspicious behavior and intelligence gathering.  “[F]undamentally, believing 
that you can achieve safety by looking at characteristics instead of behavior is 
silly,” one of the officials told the Boston Globe.88  “If your goal is preventing 
attacks. . .you want your eyes and ears looking for pre-attack behaviors, not 
characteristics.”89 
The fourth point may be the most important of all as we consider using 
racial profiling against Al Qaeda.  The profiling of Middle Easterners shows a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of what we are up against in Al 
Qaeda.  The Al Qaeda organization is a viciously murderous terrorist 
organization based in the Middle East that is bent on killing Americans and 
Westerners.90  No one disagrees with these facts.  But Al Qaeda is something 
else as well: an organization that has consistently shown itself to be highly 
intelligent, patient, and thoroughly adaptable.  Woe be unto us if we forget this.  
The attack on the World Trade Towers on September 11 was not the first 
assault on this landmark, but the second.  When the first attack, in 1993,91 
failed to accomplish their goal, these terrorists took eight years to install a new 
set of agents on American soil, devise an entirely new method of attack, plan it 
down to the smallest detail, and then practice it so that it could be carried out 
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almost perfectly.92  These people are not stupid; just because they are killers 
does not mean that we can count on them to act like fools.  Since Al Qaeda 
knows we are now looking for young, Middle Eastern suicide hijackers, they 
will almost certainly try something different—for example, attacking us with 
non-Arabs from countries outside the Middle East, like British citizen Richard 
Reid93 or American Jose Padilla,94 or attempting to get explosives on airliners 
in luggage of unsuspecting passengers or the tons of unscreened cargo that are 
shipped on commercial jets everyday.95 
Those who insist on the “common sense” of focusing on Middle Eastern 
men ignore all of this.  They suggest that the U.S. can be safe if we focus on 
and inconvenience only suspicious “others,” not ourselves.  These people face 
backwards, toward the past—when the only way to safety is to look forward, 
toward what our enemy may do next. 
 
 92. Walter Pinkus, Mueller Outlines Origin, Funding of Sept. 11 Plot, WASH. POST, June 6, 
2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 21749706. 
 93. David Johnston, A Nation Challenged: The Bombing Suspect; Al Qaeda Trained 
Bombing Suspect, Indictment Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A1, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/search/article-
page.html?res=9c04E6D71138F934A25752C0A9649C8B63. 
 94. Associated Press, Padilla Lawyers to Give Arguments on Secret Report: Government 
Challenges Disclosure, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2002, at A15, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13903-2002Oct24.html. 
 95. See Blake Morrison, Failures In Cargo Security Reported, USA TODAY, May 22, 2002, 
at 1A. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
94 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:73 
 
 
